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ON THE STRUCTURE OF A CIVIL CODE
ALAIN LEVASSEUR*
INTRODUCTION
The civil code has always been for the civil lawyer one of those
rich fertile fields in which one can, with some intelligence, reflection
and shrewd ness,

harvest the fruits

of

one's creative

efforts.

Harvests seem to be endless: they appear more and more beautiful
and elaborate, so much so that the instrument one hand les, the
tool that helps to engender so many highly sophisticated intellec
tual works, is relegated to the background. We should like here
to lean for a little while on this instrument, on its outlook or its
shape, on its formal structure, rather than on its intellectual con
tent. We thereby hope to honor the memory of our deeply revered
professor and prominent colleague, Clarence J. Morrow, whose
skill, dexterity and perfect knowledge of the Louisiana Civil Code
had always been a subject of wonder and admiration on the part
of his students and fellow scholars.
SCOPE OF A CODE
Just as there are certain guidelines to which an architect must
adhere when drawing his master plans, so too, the structural
organization of a code is not left to hazard. It was necessary at the
outset to limit its scope so that it would not infringe upon legal
questions that do not belong to its essence, whether it be a civil,
criminal, or commercial code. Therefore, the drafters of the "civil
code" first had to agree on what they meant by "civil code." Once
this agreement was reached, all the substance of what was to become
the civil code had to be organized following a plan that would lend
itself to fiexibility--one offering many alternatives. A choice having
been made as to which alternative was the best, it remained to
classify, within the plan previously adopted, the articles which
would reproduce the whole substance of the "civil" code.
To a common law lawyer, and may I venture to say to a great
many civil law lawyers, the meaning of the word "civil" is either
unknown or unclear. Let

us

not blame them since a precise and

indisputable definition of the word would be impossible to give in
view of the fact that the meaning of the word has varied greatly
in the history of law. In Roman law, "civil" law was opposed to
"natural" law, or, in other words, the civil law was the positive
* Assistant
Professor, Tulane University School of Law (on leave of
absence).
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law the law enacted by the people and even more precisely, by the

�

peo le of one city. The most acceptable sense of the word is indi
cated by Gaius when he writes "The law that each people has given
to itself ... is its own and is called 'civil law,' that is to say the law
proper to the city."1 In this sense therefore, "the civil law of the
Romans is the compendium of all the laws of their city."2 There is
no doubt that in our civil law systems of today the meaning of the
word "civil" has undergone a considerable limitation,

since

it

refers only to that part of the law that governs the relations of
men with one another. This limitation of the scope of the word
finds its explanation in the history of Rome, the fall of the Roman
Empire, and the second revival of Roman law in Europe in the
late sixteenth century.
Of the Roman laws which became the written reason of
Europe, only those laws dealing with family, successions
and contracts were selected. All that was concerned with the
government, the police, administration and the military had
become too foreign to what then existed to be adopted. The
habit developed of giving the name of civil law exclusively
to that part of Roman law that governed the personal in
terests of the citizens. As a consequence the words "civil
law" no longer had so extensive a meaning as they had in
the past. Thus there resulted in our modern days this division
between different codes of the different kinds of laws accord
ing to the various things they deal with.a
It is this last meaning of the word "civil" that prevailed in the
days when the French Civil Code, and later the Louisiana Civil
Code, were drafted. The scope of the civil code was thus limited
to those matters having to do with the relations between men. Yet
these matters were so numerous as to impose the necessity of
organizing them into a coherent frame. In their search for such
a frame, the drafters of the code could rely heavily on the teachings
and experience of the past before they decided on one alternative
or another.
TEACHINGS

AND EX PE RIENCE OF THE PAST

How many Louisiana lawyers have asked themselves the ques
. i_i : ':hy three books in the civil code? Nothing, a priori, seems
ho
to J ustify such a distribution, and it i s well known that when the
1
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four drafters of the Code Civil4 started working on their code,
there had been no previous discussion as to the division of the code
into three books. There is no doubt that the weight of Roman law
forced the hazard of the choice, if hazard there was. In fact, the
plan can be traced back to Gaius and his Institutes.
The plan of these Institutes is built around three titles, and all
the rules of civil law are gathered under them. "Omne autem jus
quo utimur vel ad personas pertinet, vel ad res, vel ad actiones."r>

Thus, according to Gaius, all the law that we use belongs either to
persons or to things or to actions. There seems to be no earlier
legal work with such a division into three parts, and one can think
that Gaius fathered it and that Justinian simply borrowed it.6
However, until the end of the sixteenth century, the plan o f Jus
tinian's Institutes had very little influence, and Domat ignored it
completely in his famous treatise.7 In Domat's opinion, the most
natural division is that which consists in distinguishing the legal
ties that men create in their everyday lives from those they inherit
from their fathers by succession. This d ivision by Domat illustrates
a collective approach to private law, whereas the essence of the
latter is to be individualistic, and for that reason, it is believed
that Domat's classification has had no influence at all on jurists.
Among the other works which were written from the time of the
second revival of Roman law until the late 1870's8 and which show
a strong influence on the plan of the Institutes, we must mention
Pothier's treatise9 of 1670, which reproduced the division between
persons, things and actions, and Bourjon's work10 of 1747.
ORGANIZATION OF

A

C ODE

One could say that there is no book, either in the Louisiana
Civil Code or in the Code Civil, on the matter of actions, but rather
4

See Lev asseur, Code Napoleon or C ode Portalis?, 43 Tul. L. Rev. 762-66

(1969).

5 Gaius Institutes 1.2.8. See also Justinian Institutes 1.2.12; Digest 1.5.1;
De Jure Naturale 1.2.
6 R. Lee, The Elements of Roman Law 38 (1944):
The first Book will tell us what are the principal classes of persons
known to Roman Law This is the Law relating to Persons. The next
section, comprising in Gaius Books II a�d Ill an� in Justinian Books II
and III and Titles I to V of Book IV, will deal with the substance of the
Law. This is the Law relating to Things. r:fhe last section, c�mprising in
Gaius the whole and in Justinian the remainder of Book IV, is c oncerned
principally with procedure. This is the Law relating to Actions.
(1694) .
7 J. D omat Les Lois Civiles dans Leur Ordre Nature!
s See Hau ou, Note sur rlnftuence Exercee PM les Institutes en Matiere
de Classification du Droit, 7 Rev. Crit. de Leg. et _de Jur. 373 (1887).
9 R. Pothier, Introduction a la Coutume d'Orleans (1670).
10 F. Bourjon, Le Droit Commun de la France et la Coutume de Paris
Reduite en Principes (1747). Bourjon adopted the general classific ation of the
Institutes ' but devoted one book to the .law of persons, four books to the law
of things, and one book to the law of actions.

rl
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things.
acq uiring the ownership of
a third book o n the modes of
ern
nt difference between our mod
There lies, indeed, a very importa
tinian. One half of what was
works and those of Gaius and Jus
the Institutes has been trans
encompassed in the third book of
"persons" and the other half
ferred, in our codes, to the book on
l Procedure. In the law of
has been included in the Code of Civi
between "things" and
the Institutes, obligations were inserted
s.11 It was s o because at
"actions" and belonged to both categorie
as a mode of acquiring
Roman law obligations were considered not
ds acquisitio n,
ownership, but simply as a prelim inary step towar
fer of the
which was completed only by traditio or actual trans
the Ancien
thing. This has changed since the courts and tribun als of
of the
Regime which effected a drastic change in the conseq uences
accord
obligation "to give" by holding i t to be sufficient of its own
the
to achieve the transfer and acqui sition of ownership. Such is
2
of
e
0
rticl
a
first
meaning of Louisiana Civil Code a rticle 87 ,1 the
Book III, and a title by itself (which stresses the i mportance of
its provision), and article 1907,13 which points out the difference
from the law of the Institutes. Obligations, therefore, had to be
separated from res and actiones to become part of a new thirp
book, due to take the place of the then disrupted book on "actions."

This tripartite division was adopte d by the drafters of the French
Code as a natural heritage of a juridicial tradition. Maleville14 tells
us that such a divisio:i;i was agreed upon without any adverse
opinion, although he admits that it is far from being the best.15 This
division into three parts was thus not rested upon fully convincing
justifications.

�ub�idiary to the main question of tripartite division is

settmg

m

�

th t of

order the topics of the three books. Why have "persons"

been placed before "things," and why have the latter been placed

us.t'mian Inst1tutes
·
2.2.2, where obligations are made part of
Digest 44.7 and Code 4.10' where obligations are made
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·
.
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La. Civil Code art. 870 (1870):
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books of the Cod �
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before the modes of acquiring them? Such an order is often taken
for granted and does not appeal to the curiosity of the reader.
There is, however, a logic and an explanation behind this taken-for
granted presentation. There would not be any law in the absence of
a human being to create it, a human being to benefit from i t or to
suffer under it. Natural sense and logic command that persons be
considered before the things they will own, or benefit from, or suffer
from. And things should be dealt with before the modes of acquiring
them-establishing the kind of legal ties men can create with things
requires that the latter be defined first. Lastly, things becoming the
objects of transactions between men, the third book should log
ically define these various transactions and enumerate the rights
they generate.16

This problem of organizing the code, putting it into order, was
the least difficult that the drafters of the civil code had to face in
their immense work. In fact, this was done as the last matter and
did not raise many difficulties. The hard core of the work was
the actual writing of the articles themselves. There, indeed, lay
the mammoth work."A code is not the arbitrary and spontaneous
pro duct of a legislative thought in the process of enacting. A code
sums up in its provisions the results achieved by the labor of
reason in the past centuries."17 The redactors of codes "adopt what
has been given to us by the general legal culture. But not every
thing can be adopted, adapted to the needs of the State that expects
this 'important codification.' It is necessary to create many new
legal rules: codification cannot be' a compilation."18 Codification is
an art that obeys some stringent rules.
These rules concern the methods of expression, taken in a large
sense, and the intellectual mechanism that permits one to find his
way through the code. As regards the methods of expression, many
remarks of more or less deep implication could be made, but we
shall limit ourselves to the style of the articles, their various
grammatical natures, and the institutions of the civil code.
THE ARTICLES: THEIR S TYLE

AND

NATURE

One cannot but be struck by the bluntness, rigidity, abstract
ness and coldness of the style of the code articles, but this is by
no means peculiar to only the French and Louisiana Civil Codes.
A look at the German or Swiss Civil Codes is enough to convince
us that such a style is proper to any civil code. Bonaparte, however,
16 An interesting analysis of the order of the Code Civil can be found in
M. de Chassat Trait.e de !'Interpretation des Lois (1822).
11 1 T. H c, Commentaire Tbeorique et Pratique du Code Civil 87 (1892)
(author's translation).
.
1s Golab Theori.e et Technique de la Codification, m Studi F1losofico-G1union).
translat
s
dici
a Giorgio del Vecchio 296 (author'

d

.

Dedicatf

•

.

.

.

.

·
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was utterly critical of this style: "The vice of our modern legisla
tions is that they do not speak to imagination. Man can be gov
erned only by imagination; without it, man is a brute. It is a mis
take to govern men like things; it is by speaking t o man's soul
that he can be thrilled...."19 Despite the truth t h a t one can find
in this statement, the technicians who wrote t h e

code articles

wanted to appeal neither to man's imagination nor to his feelings.
They were convinced of the impossibility of parrying technicality
for the reason that there is a language of the laws which warrants
its adaptability and pliability. "The law (la

loi),

wh ich has neither

eyes nor ears, should be able to be modified where equity requires
it, following the circumstances and the inconveniences i t creates in
particular cases."20 The history of the broadening of article 1372
of the

Code Civil

and article 2295 of the Louisiana Civil Code is

highly illustrative of this necessity. How much more could be said

Code Civil

and articles 2317-2318 of the
Louisiana Civil Code?21 Thus, t e chnicality of the language of the

of article 1384 of the

articles will ensure their stability, and therefore their prestige,
because they are made of special words deprived of their common
and popular meaning. The words are, in a sense, "juridicalized,"
taken out of the real and the palpable to be shaped into an abstract
concept. There lies the true originality, almost the mystery, of the
code articles. The code articles that formulate definitions of legal
concepts illustrate very well the s t yle of the code.
Remembering the well-known warning of

definitio in jure periculosa,"

"omnis

the

Digest, that

the drafters of the

Code Civil

did their best to evade the difficult task of drafting too many defi
nitions. This care was clearly stated by Portalis, speaking on be
half of his colleagues in the commission:
The general defn
i itions for the most part include only
vague and abstract expressions, whose meaning is often
more difficult to determine than the meaning of the thing
itself that is defined.. . . All that is definition, teaching,
.
doctrm
e, belongs to the domain of science. All that is order,
rule-properly so called-belongs to the domai n of laws.
. 22
.

.

The civil code has grown older, life has underg
one deep social
and mater ial changes, but together they
have worke d toward
19 Thiba� deau, Memoires sur le Consultat de 1799 a
1804 par un Anci en
. ler d Etat
Conse1l
419-24 (author's trans lation

�� �· P�rtalis, quoted in � Fenet, supra not)� 2, at 33

(author's translation).
tone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana:
The Concept of Fault, 27 T ul. L.
(�9?2); see also the following works of G. Theall: Comment, Tort
�·
t a
h S upplementary Tort Articles 28172822, 44 Tul. L.
Re
9 i
),
u L R
907 (1969).
;�.. 6 Fenet, supra note. 2,• at ev.
42 (author's translation).

R
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changes in the courts' decisions, while still in agreement with the
fixity of the words. The code has been written in such a way that
it can be fashioned differently by contemporary judges administer
ing justice in countries ruled by similar codes.
All the code articles do not have the same force, the same value.
Broadly speaking, the grammatical nature of the articles leads to
a two-fold division of the provisions of the code: imperative or
positive provisions, and suppletory or declaratory provisions.23 Im
perative or positive provisions are those falling within the terms
of article 2 of the Louisiana Civil Code.24 Each is an illustration of
the obligation the legislator had to face, i.e., solve a conflict of in
terests. A choice had to be made, and no option or choice could be
left to the parties. An obligation is often expressed by the use of
verbs25 such as "oblige,"26 "must,"27 or "to be bound to,"28 or, more
frequently, "to be."29 It can also be expressed with an adjective or
past participle such as "executed"30 or "responsible for."31 Supple
tory or declaratory provisions are so called because they leave to the
parties the option to decide otherwise. But, in the event they omit to
do so, the suppletory provisions are brought in to fill the gap, to
"supplement" the will of the parties.32 In these cases, the legislator
has considered the point to be of minor importance, because it was
not endangering the established order. Some freedom could be left
to the parties to create their own law within the limits determined
by the suppletory provisions.
THE INSTITUTIONS
Within the broad field hedged by the imprecise contours of the
captio ns of the books, the drafters of the code intended to fit a
group of well-defined institutions linked together by the simple
23 A third element could be added to this twofold classification to include
what one might call "transitional provisions." In this category we would place
articles such as La. Civil Code arts. 1995, 2668 (1870). Such articles do not add
to the substance of the law, they neither order, permit, nor forbid; they simply
make easier and more pleasant the reading of the Code. These articles have no
equivalents in the Code Civil. This third element has been added at the sugges
tion of Mr. Gary Theall, whose cooperation and advice have been very helpful
to me.
24 La. Civil Code art.

2 (1870):

[Law] orders and permits and forbids, it annou.nces rewar�s and
punishments, its provisions generall� relate not to sohta.ry and smgular
cases but to what passes in the ordmar y course of affairs.
25 The present and future tenses of the verbs given are of ten equivalent to
an obligation. See, e.g., La. Civil Code arts. 2509 (present), 203-205 (future).
20 E.g., La. Civil Code art. 2315 (1870).
21 E.g., La. Civil Code art. 2489 (1870).
28 E.g., La. Civil Code art. 645 (1870).
29 E.g., La. Civil Code art. 19 (1870).
ao E.g., La. Civil Code art. 5 (1870).
31 E.g., La. Civil Code arts. 2316, 2317 (1870).
s2 E.g., La. Civil Code art. 2461 (1870).
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thread of the necessity of a total organization. These institutions
have been identified by one word or one short heading that cor
responds to the captions of the different titles. Each single institu
tion has been analyzed as a whole within the title of which it
forms the substance (e.g., Of Domicile, Of Absentees, Of Husband
and Wife). The analysis of the institution leads to a listing of its
elements either in chapters (whenever the title consists of one
institution only) or in sections (whenever several institutions are
grouped within one title, each institution subsequently becoming
the caption of a chapter). The purpose o f such systematic con
struction in the titles, chapters and sections was to create an in
tellectual mechanism that would inevitably and necessarily guide
the lawyer toward an awareness of the existence of a fixed rapport
between all the elements of each institution. The intended result
is that, for example, whenever the word "sale" is mentioned, it
brings to one's mind not only the definition of sale but also all the
elements of "a sale," such as risk of the thing, or obligations of
the parties. All these elements are necessary parts of a coherent
and solidary whole, which is the institution. Such a "whole" could
easily be compared to a chemical product that could not be achieved
if any one of its components were missing. Furthermore, any
extraneous element would spoil the product wanted, ruin it or
result in something else. Thus, a judge or any interpreter of the
law must necessarily distinguish between those elements required
by the law and those that would be outside its scope. In a codified
system of law, whatever is not explicitly laid down in the articles
will of necessity lie in the domain of uncertainty and controversy.
A s an illustration of the truth of this statement, it is enough to
recall that the actio de in rem verso, because it it not explicitly
stated in the code, still divides the doctrine on its very existence,
to say nothing of its elements.sa
INTERDEPENDENCE
Although we have insisted on the fact that each institution must
be conside �ed as a whole and each title as an entity, we are by no

� ea?s �aymg

at the code consists of a simple juxtaposition of
msbtubons foreign to one another. It is there that the concept of
"code" and the spirit that pervades it emerge to provide the intel

�

lectual mechanis� that is like the framework of a building, the
ess �f which would cause the building to fall. This mech
w
anism consists mainly in the methods of reasoning (which we shall
not expound here because the depth of the topic is incompatible

�

p

:; �m;nent,43ATulctio
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•
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De In Rem Verso
L. Rev. 263 (1969).
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with the limits of this article34) and, secondarily, in the notions of
interdependence between the articles.This interdependence exists
on two levels : between the code articles as such and between the
articles that define an institution and those defining another insti
tution.
The demonstration of the close interdependence between two
or more consecutive articles need not be long to be convincing.
Broadly speaking, a code article is composed of two elements.The
first could be d ubbed the "hypothesis ;" the second would then be
the "solution." For example, in article 57 the hypothesis is,
"[w]hen a person shall not have appeared at the place of his
domicile or habitual residence, and when such person shall not
have been heard of, for five years
" When such a situation
exists, the solution is that "his presumptive heirs may....
"35 In
article 1893 the hypothesis laid down consists in "[a]n obligation
without a cause, or with a false or unlawful cause," and the solu
tion is that it "can have no effect."36 Furthermore, an article may
have as its hypothesis another article.For example, article 223 is
the hypothesis of the solution given in article 224; article 1901 has
article 1779 as its hypothesis.37 These examples show that the r ules
of law cannot be separated one from the other, that they are linked
and interwoven so as to support one another.
.

.

.

•

The second level of interdependence appears with the institu
tions contained in the code. A careful reading of the preparatory
work s for the French Civil Code will convince the reader that the
drafters meant to organize the different institutions strictly and
at the same time to reach a precise correspondence between the
headings and the provisions they encompass.38 However, the use of
84 See, e.g., C. J. Morrow quoted
44 Tul. L. Rev. 675 (1970). [Ed.]
35

in accompanying article by Judge Tate at

La. Civil Code art. 57 (1870).

30 La. Civil Code art. 1893 (1870).

87

La. Civil Code art. 223 (1870) :
Fathers and mothers shall have, during marriage, the enjoyment of
the estate of their children until their majority or emancipation.
La. Civil Code art. 224 (1870):
The obligations resulting from this enjoyment shall be: 1. The same
obligations to which usufructuaries are subjected; 2. To support, to
m aintain and to educate their children according to their situation in
life.
La. Civil Code art. 1779 (1870):
Four requisites are necessary to the validity of a contract: 1. Parties
legally capable of contracting. 2. Their consent legally given. 3. A certain
object, which forms the matter of agreement. 4 . A lawful purpose.

La. Civil Code art. 1901 (1870):
Agreements legally entered into have the e:ffect of laws on those who
have formed them.
They can not be revoked, unless by mutual consent of the parties, or
for causes acknowledged by law.
They must be performed with good faith.
as See 13 Fenet, supra note 2, at 121, 145; 14 Fenet at 440.
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these separate headings did not carry with it the partitioning of
the institutions. They cannot be relied on so as to exclude one
another or oppose one another. Article 21939 of the Louisiana Code
would suffice to

support such a

s tatement, but article

243840

also provides clear illustration of this interdependence between two
institutions. But there is, in this case and in several others, another
reason for this interdependence: it is the existence o f a rapport
between the "general" and the "particular." The contract of sale
is but a particular kind of "conventional obligations." Some less
conspicuous rapport exists in the code between institutions, and
it can even happen that the "particular" precedes the "general."
This may sound aberrant at first hand, but when one thinks about
it, it simply testifies that the civil code is but "one law" with so
many articles which had to be organized one way or another. One
example is that of Titles II and III o f Book III. Title II reads "Of
Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa;" article 1468 reads, "A
donation inter vivos (between living persons) is an act by which
the donor divests himself, at present and irrev ocably, of the thing
given, in favor of the donee who accepts it."41 Bringing this article
together with article 176142 of Title III will necessarily lead one to
the conclusion that a donation inter vivos is a "particular" element
of the general category of "conventional obligations." The reason is
that donation inter vivos is also a "particular" item in another
general category which is defined by article 1467 as being a "gratu
itous transfer of property."43 These examples are simple evidence
of the fact that the heading should not be given a decisive legal
authority, excluding any provision which pertains to another
institution. The headings help the lawyer to find his way through
the code, but the interpreter that h e is should not be misled.44 "One

La. Civil Code art. 219 (1870):
. The fath�r �nd mo�her have a right to ap oint tutors to their
chtldre�, a� is directed m the title: Of Minors' o j their Tutorship and

39

Emancipation.

La. Civil Code art. 2438 (1870):
. In all cases, where no special provision is made under the presen t
title, the c�ntract of sale is subjected to the general rules established
under the title: 0/ Conventional Obligations
41 La. C��l Code art. 1468 (1870), as
amended ' La. Acts 1871 ' No. 87.
42 La. ClVll Co�e art. 1761 (1870):
a
n a eement, b� which
person obligates himself
to !o�h�� £J �iv: t0�0 or pernut, or notone
to do something, expressed
or i·mp1•1ed 'by sueh' agreement
4a La. Civil Code art. 1467 (1S70)
.
. .
44 See N. Gisclair Custom
a F'ormal S?urce of Law m
Lou1s1ana, May 5
1969 (unpublished p�p er m. ]TA_uslane
Law Library), where the author states,
that "the fact
. that. [c stom is placed
the general heading 'Of Law'
does not of �ise� ��e i�t the for. ce of lawunder
[citing La. R.S. 1:13 (1950)' which
provi des th
a � are,, given for purposes . of .convenience and do not
constitute part of th
The same rule applies m French law. Ministere
Publi c c. Guillemain (1;�t
•o

1970]
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must admit that the provisions that each [heading] encompasses
are mainly related to the subject defined by such heading. But,
one must not forget that law is not a theoretical manual, that every
legal provision must be considered in itself as well as in its relations
with those that precede it or �hat follow it."411
CONCLUSION

The civil code appears through these short remarks as the work
of real archit e cts. Quite understandably, its look and its shape have
not attracted the jurists so much as has the substance of its pro
visions. Nevertheless, the drafters of the civil codes have proved
themselves to be "legal" technicians to the point of paying the ut
most attention to the problems of organization and composition of
the articles. The civil code presents itself as an

a

priori impossible

combination of two diametrically opposed trends: one is systema
tization, the other is parceling out. Indeed, any one of the code
articles can be taken out with its number, which is like a name to
identify and individualize it, to serve as the basis for a court's de
cision. An article will be the basis of a lawyer's brief and may be
challenged by another article that will serve as the cornerstone of
the opponent's brief. It will be up t o the judge to gather the pieces
together and reconcile the code articles in order to achieve the
systematization that was the goal of the drafters of the code. The
civil code is one and only one law; it is a whole built on "n" arti
cles, each essential t o the whole. "The civil code is a well ordered
monument, whose design and outlooks have a meaning. Beyond this
apparent arrangement, there exist implicit and changing coordina
tions, a deep life, hidden feelings and conceptions which are the
true cement of the legal provisions."46
45 C. Brocher, :Etude sur Jes Principles Generaux de !'Interpretation des
Lois et Specialement du Code Napoleon 67 (1870) (author's translation).
46 J. Ray, Essai sur la Structure Logique du Code Civil Fran�ais (1926)
(au thor's translation). This work was the main source of our documentat ion
and we largely relied on it.

